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In this study, we investigate the role of myopic loss aversion (MLA) risk preferences
on pre-harvest grain marketing decisions using a laboratory experiment. Prospect
theory parameters were estimated to measure MLA. We estimated a power function for
utility and obtained power estimates indicating linear utility for gains and concave
utility for losses. We obtained a loss aversion parameter estimate that suggests the
presence of loss aversion. We found evidence of probability weighting for both gains
and losses. We classified individuals into three categories based on their MLA status.
They are no NMLA, MLA, and high loss aversion (HLA). We observed participants’
grain marketing behavior using a novel marketing simulation game called Marketing in
a New Era (MINE). The findings of our study show that MLA does not significantly
influence pre-harvest grain marketing behavior. However, we found that high loss
aversion (HLA), significantly impact pre-harvest hedging positively. Specifically, we
found that subjects with HLA significantly hedged more of their expected yield than
subjects with no MLA (NMLA). We found evidence that suggests that buying crop
insurance leads to increased profit. We found no significant difference between risk
attitude and profit made.
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Chapter1
1.0
Introduction
Grain marketing represents the process of converting bushels into dollars and represents
a major component of the producer’s net income calculation. Grain marketing exists in
a complex decision environment due to unknown price, yield fluctuations, and producer
preferences. The price of grain is unknown and cannot be accurately predicted. On
average, the price of grain in the spring, for harvest delivery is higher than the realized
fall price. (Groskopf and Walters 2017). This provides an incentive for producers who
are interested in pre-harvest marketing, defined as selling grain before harvest, to
engage in hedging in the spring.
A producer pre-selling grain in the spring can hedge against price risk through
a variety of tools, including privately provided tools such as forward contracting as well
as publicly provided tools such as participating in crop insurance. Combinations of
private and publicly available tools are also possible. Each tool comes with costs and
benefits. Pre-harvest marketing exposes the producer to the risk of buying back presold contracts when they produce less than the quantity they hedged. The producer feels
the disadvantage of hedging when they are short bushels and fall grain prices are higher
than the hedged price. Participating in crop insurance requires participants to pay
premiums, increasing production costs.
While the benefits and costs of tools are useful, it is important to understand the
set of possible outcomes from engaging in pre-harvest hedging. 1 The first possible
outcome is where the price at harvest is lower than the spring hedged price. In this case,
the net-income of the producer will be higher as opposed to a producer who did not
engage in pre-harvest hedging. This outcome might encourage the producer to engage
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We focus our discussion of outcomes by grouping them on the directional change from the spring price.
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in hedging in a subsequent year. Another possible outcome of pre-harvest hedging is
the case of a bad year (for example a drought year that results in low yield) in which
price at harvest is higher than the spring hedged price and the producer pre-sold quantity
higher than the actual yield at harvest. In this case, the producer is financially worse off
over doing nothing as they had to buy back pre-sold contracts at a higher price than
sold. This second scenario might negatively affect the quantity of grain that the
producer will be willing to hedge if any at all in the subsequent year. Despite the
possibility of being worse off by engaging in spring hedging in some years as opposed
to doing nothing, empirical studies have shown that producers can reduce the variance
of their annual gross income by engaging in pre-harvest hedging (Zulauf et al. 2001).
Given the historical marked difference between the value of grain priced in the spring
for harvest delivery and grain priced at harvest in most years, it makes one question
why most producers do not engage in pre-harvest hedging. In fact, a survey of producers
in Kansas, Iowa, and Texas showed that 64% of grain produced is sold through the cash
market at harvest (Sartwelle et al. 2000). Given the fact that the majority of producers
do not engage in hedging, it is important to identify the factors driving producers’
hedging behavior.
In this study, we attempt to improve our understanding of producers' pre-harvest
hedging behavior using a framework other than expected utility. Empirical studies have
shown that producers' behavior under risk and uncertainty do not always follow the
assumptions of expected utility theory (Collins, Musser, and Mason 1991; Rabin 2000;
Fryza and Mattos 2010). In this study, we examine the producer's pre-harvest hedging
behavior using myopic loss aversion proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) is a combination of two behavioral concepts; loss
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), a concept that
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implies that people weight losses more heavily than gains (Gneezy and Potters 1997)
and mental accounting that refers to the method that people use in coding and evaluating
financial outcomes. A myopic decision-maker is one that frames decisions and
outcomes narrowly (Thaler et al. 1997), a myopic investor makes choices that favor the
short-term. Fryza and Mattos (2010) argued that decision-makers weight short term
outcomes more heavily than long-term. According to Thaler et al. (1997), a myopic
decision maker evaluates a prospect from a series of investment and then reject the
entire sequence if he does not like the initial prospect in the series. MLA can make a
loss-averse investor take an unprofitable market position because of their attitude
towards loss (Brorsen 2010).
We are interested in identifying whether MLA can explain the producer’s
behavior towards pre-harvest hedging. A producer can be modeled as an investor that
makes a series of investment decisions and gets feedback on the investment annually.
Every year a producer is faced with the decision to allocate the portion of their output
to sell before harvest and the portion to sell at harvest. At the end of the year, the
outcome of their decision is made known to them; they evaluate the outcome and decide
for the next year. In this study, we design an economic experiment to evaluate the role
of MLA in the producer’s grain marketing behavior. An experimental approach is more
suitable in understanding variability in risk preferences and its influence on grain
marketing behavior (Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2014). As the experimental
approach makes it possible to study risk attitude over a wide range of possible
outcomes. It provides the opportunity to study the producer’s grain marketing behavior
that cannot be understood from an aggregated market report.
In a bid to improve producer’s marketing techniques, the first trend in literature
on grain marketing focused on providing an optimal hedging level (Miller 1986; Berg
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1986; Loy and Pieniadz 2009). Most of these studies did not consider risk preferences
in generating optimal hedging levels. They were more interested in developing
marketing techniques that reduce price and income risk (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman
1996). Over the last few decades, there have been some works of literature addressing
the importance of producer’s risk preferences in decision-making. Only a few of these
studies focused on grain marketing (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Blakeslee
1997; Cabrini, Irwin, and Good 2009). Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) used data
from a survey of producers in the mid-west to study the role of risk preferences in grain
marketing. They used a subjective approach to measure risk preferences. Blakeslee
(1997) evaluated the role of risk aversion in optimal grain marketing decisions under
the expected utility framework using simulated data. Cabrini, Irwin, and Good (2009)
evaluated the role of behavioral biases and loss aversion in recommendations by
marketing advisory services. They measured loss aversion by comparing the time that
market advisory experts hold gain positions over loss positions. Our study is uniquely
different from these other studies because we use an experimental approach to measure
individual risk preferences and our ability to observe grain marketing behavior. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study linking individual risk preferences to preharvest grain marketing decisions.
The primary objective of this study is to explore the role of myopic loss aversion
risk preferences in grain marketing behavior with emphasis on pre-harvest marketing.
To meet this objective, we designed a three stages experiment. In the first stage, we
estimated prospect theory parameters following the approach of Abdellaoui et al.
(2008). The results of stage 1 allow us to measure MLA using the approach presented
by Langer and Webber (2005). In the second stage of the experiment, we used a novel
computer marketing simulation game called Marketing in a New Era (MINE). In this
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stage, the subjects assumed the role of a producer faced with the decision of hedging
(part or all) their expected yield before harvest or do nothing and make use of the spot
market. In making this decision, the subjects are faced with yield risk and price
uncertainty. The third stage of the experiment is a brief survey of the sociodemographic characteristics of the participants.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1
A Review of Grain Marketing Contracts, Yield Risk, and Crop Insurance
Selling grain is one of the most important financial decisions producers make every
year. Selling crops before it is produced is one way the producer manages price risk
(Paul 1985), and this act is called hedging. Hedging exposes the producer to yield risk
since the crop they are marketing is yet to be produced. There are several pre-harvest
contracts that a farmer can engage in, they include but not limited to cash forward
contracts, futures contracts, and options contracts. The futures and options contracts are
more standardized contracts than the cash forward contract (Paul 1985), although the
use of options contracts is not common among producers. The cash forward contract
allows the producer to target and lock in a price for grain to be delivered on a specified
date in the future. In engaging in forward contracts the producer cannot benefit from an
unexpected increase in price but they are protected from any form of a price decrease.
The futures contract is similar to the cash forward contracts, just like the cash forward
contract the futures contract allows the producer to lock in a price for grain to be
delivered in the future. The futures market allows contracts to be traded on an exchange
and the participants do not necessarily have to make delivery, they can offset the
contract by taking an opposite position in the market. Unlike the cash forward contract,
the futures contract allows the producer to benefit from an unexpected increase in price
while at the same time exposing them to basis risk. Basis is the difference between the
futures price and the cash price, the basis is important to the producer because they
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eventually use the spot market to deliver their grain. As stated before the grain contracts
available to producers are not limited to what we have discussed so far. To improve
grain marketing experience for producers, some grain industries have developed
different marketing contracts. Hagedorn et al. (2003) summarized different marketing
contracts which they termed “new generation contracts”. The new generation contracts
make marketing less complex for producers by generating hedging contracts that are
automated, some of the contracts are designed using the average of cash or futures
prices over a period. When the automated pricing is used for futures contracts, the
producer will still be exposed to basis risk. Hedge to arrive is another form of preharvest contract that allows the producer to lock only the futures component of a cash
forward contract with the option of fixing the basis at a later date.
Irrespective of the type of contract used at the pre-harvest level, engaging in any
form of hedging exposes the producer to yield risk. To manage yield risk exposure, the
producer can buy crop insurance at the beginning of the planting season. Yield
protection and revenue protection are the two types of crop insurance contracts that the
producer can purchase. The yield protection covers only yield risk while revenue
protection covers both price and yield risk.
Several factors can affect a producer's decision to purchase crop insurance.
Ginger and Aslihan (2006) studied the factors that influence a producer’s decision to
purchase an insurance contract. They found that farmers consider the cost of the
insurance premium and the availability of some discount on the premium when making
insurance decisions. Ginger and Aslihan (2006) also reported that in making an
insurance purchase decision, farmers are more concerned about the cost of insurance
premium than the chance of getting an indemnity in the event of an unprecedented
disaster. Jin, Wang, and Wang (2018) examined the role of risk attitude in purchasing
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weather index insurance in rural China. The results of their study indicate that risk
aversion and farmer’s belief of experiencing loss significantly affect the likelihood of
purchasing weather index insurance
2.2
Risk Preferences and Producer’s Decision Making Behavior
The concept of risk is an important component of most agricultural economic studies
involving decision making under uncertainty. This is as a result of the nature of
agricultural production and marketing that requires the farmer to make some decisions
under risk (Bocqueho, Jacquet and Reynaud 2011). The producer's decision-making
behavior under risk depends on the level of risk faced and risk preferences. For this
reason, the producer’s behavior has been extensively studied under expected utility
theory (Rolfo 1980; SriRamaratnam 1987; Saha, Shumway and Talpaz 1994). Expected
utility theory assumes that decision-makers are always rational and follow the axioms
of rational choice (Nicholson and Snyder 2012). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued
that the expected utility is not a satisfactory model in explaining the behavior of
decision-makers under risk. They proposed the prospect theory as a substitute model in
explaining decision making under risk. Utility theory assumes that a decision-maker
only accept a prospect after integrating utility from the prospect and the utility of their
asset, the prospect is acceptable only if the utility from the prospect and asset is greater
than the utility of the asset alone. In other words, the decision-maker does not care about
gains or losses but rather cares more about the final state of wealth. Another assumption
of utility theory is that decision-makers use the given objective probability when
evaluating the outcome of a prospect. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that people
evaluate outcomes from a prospect as losses and gains rather than the final status of
wealth as assumed in expected utility. According to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979)
prospect theory, people use some anchor point when defining losses and gains. The
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anchor point is known as a reference point. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that
the reference point is neutral and it coincides with the decision maker’s present wealth
position, this makes the outcome paid by the prospect to be evaluated as gains or losses.
In contrast to expected utility, prospect theory states that people do not make use of the
objective probability of a prospect when evaluating the outcome of a prospect.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provided evidence of probability weighting which is a
violation of expected utility assumption, they found that people underweight large and
medium probabilities and overweight small probabilities. According to Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), people overweight a prospect with certain outcomes over a prospect
with a risky outcome, they termed this phenomenon as the certainty effect. Certainty
effect in a gain domain (a prospect that does not include any loss)leads to risk aversion
while it leads to risk-seeking in a loss domain (a prospect that involves no gain). Risk
seeking in loss domain is explained by loss aversion, a concept that states that losses
loom more than gains.
In summary, prospect theory proposed a value function that explains the
behavior of the decision-maker under risk. Using the value function the outcome of a
prospect depends on the reference point, the probability of each outcome in the
prospect, and the probability weighting function. The value function for gains is
concave and convex for losses.
Prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility has been tested empirically
by a good number of studies in recent years. Bocqueho, Jacquet, and Reynaud (2013)
elicited risk preferences under expected utility and prospect theory among French
producers using data obtained from a field experiment. They elicited risk preferences
using a variant of Holt and Laury (2002) multiple price list lottery. Bocqueho, Jacquet,
and Reynaud (2013) found risk-averse behavior in the gain domain among French
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producers under expected utility and prospect theory framework. They also found
evidence of loss aversion among the farmers and reported that farmers were twice
sensitive to outcomes that involve losses relative to outcomes that involve gains.
Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) examined the effect of risk attitude and farm
characteristics on pre-harvest marketing techniques. They found that producers with
prospect theory preferences were more risking-seeking after experiencing a loss year.
Franken, Pennings, and Garcia (2009) explored the influence of risk preferences and
transaction costs on hog producers marketing strategies in Illinois. They found that riskaverse producers are more likely to use the spot market when selling their product.
Franken, Pennings, and Garcia (2009) and Musser, Patrick, and Eckman (1996) both
used survey data and subjective approach to risk preferences. Mattos, Garcia, and
Pennings (2008) evaluated the influence of loss aversion and probability weighting on
producers' futures hedging behavior. They used simulated data generated from a
distribution of Illinois soybean futures and cash price. The result of the study found
evidence of probability weighting and loss aversion in determining optimal hedging
level, their results show that loss aversion only had an influence on decision making
where subject weight probability. Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018) in an attempt to test
Sandmo (1971) theory, carried out a combination of lab and field experiments. Sandmo
(1971) showed that risk-averse producers react to price uncertainty by producing less
than they would produce under price certainty. Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018) found
a result that was in contrast to Sandmo (1971), they found that participants reacted to
output price uncertainty by producing more than what they would produce when faced
with some level of price certainty. The findings of Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018)
suggest that the behavior of the producer under risk is better explained by prospect
theory than expected utility. Zhao and Yue (2019) compared risk preferences of
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producers of commodity crops and producers of specialty crop using a survey data from
producers in the U.S. They estimated prospect theory parameters using Holt and Laury
(2002) multiple price list lottery adopted for estimating prospect theory by Tanaka,
Camerer and, Nguyen (2010). Zhao and Yue (2019) found no statistical difference
between prospect theory parameters estimated from the two groups of producers.
In summary, these works of literature provide evidence that suggests that
prospect theory plays a role in producer's decision making. Most of them estimated
prospect theory using survey data (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Franken,
Pennings, and Garcia 2009; Zhao and Yue 2019 ) and a subjective measure of risk
preferences (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2009).
Among these studies, only a few (Musser, Patrick, and Eckman 1996; Mattos, Garcia
and Pennings 2008, and Bellemare, Lee and Just 2018) studied the grain marketing
behavior of the producer under prospect theory. Only Bellemare, Lee, and Just (2018)
used an experimental approach to explain producer’s behavior under risk using Holt
and Laury (2002) approach, they, however, did not estimate prospect theory parameters
for individual subjects.
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2.3
Review of Myopic Loss Aversion
The term myopic loss aversion (MLA) was first proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
in an attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle. Equity premium puzzle is a term
used to describe the unusual large difference in returns between stock and bond. It is a
puzzle because of the high level of risk aversion that is required for an investor to invest
in bonds over stocks (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Stock is a more risky investment
relative to bond, according to Mehra and Prescott (1985), it will require a relative risk
aversion of 30 to explain why an investor would choose bonds over stocks. MLA is a
concept from the “Psychology of decision-making”, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) used
two concepts to describe MLA. The first concept is loss aversion from (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) which states that losses loom more than gains, the second concept is
mental accounting, which is a subjective method that people use to code and evaluate
outcomes from a financial prospect when making decisions. According to Benartzi and
Thaler (1995), due to loss aversion, people follow a non-neutral rule when doing their
mental accounting. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) illustrated MLA using a problem posed
by Samuelson (1963) in which Samuelson asked his colleague about his willingness to
accept a bet that offers a 50% probability of winning $200 and a 50% probability of
losing $100. The colleague turns down this bet and was only willing to accept the bet
if he was given 100 chances at the bet. The colleague's reason for refusing the bet was
that the loss of $100 would pain him more than the utility of gaining $200. The decision
by Samuelson’s colleague to reject a single shot at the bet and accepting multiple shots
at the bet is inconsistent with expected utility. This illustration implies that a lossaverse decision-maker will be more willing to invest in a risky venture if they evaluate
the performance of the outcome less frequently.
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Thaler et al. (1997) empirically tested the role of MLA in decision making using
an experimental approach. They used a between-subject experimental design, in which
they had a treatment and a control group. In a multi-period game, the subjects were
tasked with allocating resources between two assets with different risk levels. To test
for myopia the authors protected the control group from myopia by having them make
the same investment allocation for several periods with less frequent feedback on the
outcome of the investment. The treatment group was not protected from myopia and
were given frequent feedback on investment outcome. Thaler et al. (1997) found that
the subjects who were protected from myopia invested more in the risky asset than
subjects who were not protected. Gneezy and Potter (1997) explored the role of
evaluation period on the acceptance of risky assets using an experimental approach.
They found that risk aversion increases with an increase in the frequency of evaluating
outcomes of investment. Haigh and List (2005) tested MLA among professional traders
and students. They found evidence of MLA among professional traders and students.
They reported that professional traders exhibited behavior consistent with MLA to a
greater extent than students. Bellamere et al. (2005) carried out an experimental study
to find out if evidence of MLA found in previous research were as a result of frequent
information feedback given to the subjects or as a result of flexibility in the investment
level. Their research question was different from that of previous studies because
previous research tested MLA by assuming feedback on investment and flexibility in
the level of investment equally contributed to MLA. Feedback refers to how often the
subjects got information on the outcome of their investment while flexibility in
investment refers to the required period of investment. Bellamere et al. (2005) were
interested in testing if feedback alone was sufficient to induce MLA. Their results show
that frequent evaluation of investment is enough to induce MLA even when subjects
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are required to maintain fixed investment over certain periods. Fellner and Sutter (2009)
found a result that was in contrast with the findings of Bellamere et al. (2005), they
found the frequency of evaluation and information feedback to be equally important in
their role in MLA.
Langer and Webber (2005) provided an objective measure of MLA to show
that it can also lead to an increase in investment level as opposed to the findings of
previous studies where MLA always leads to a decrease in investment. Langer and
Webber (2005) posited that MLA can be extended to myopic prospect theory by
introducing probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity (in the domain of gains
and losses) to the concept of MLA, where the effect of myopia does not necessarily
lead to a decrease in investment level. To prove that the presence of MLA does not
necessarily lead to a decrease in investment level, Langer and Webber (2005) used
individual prospect theory parameter estimates to calculate the utility from a single shot
at a bet and the utility from a multiple shot at the same bet. The individual is said to be
myopic if the sign on the utility of a single shot at the bet is different from the sign on
the utility from a multiple shot at the bet. Langer and Webber (2005) found that for a
risky profile that offers a small amount of gain with high probability, MLA led to an
increase in investment when the subject received feedback frequently.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Background of the study
To test the application of MLA in grain marketing, we measure MLA following the
approach of Langer and Webber (2005). To depict myopic prospect theory, Langer and
Webber (2005) defined 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 (𝑋𝑋) as the evaluation of the aggregated distribution of n
independent draws of lottery X. MLA is said to have an impact on the acceptance of n

independent draws of lottery X if and only if 𝑆𝑆1 (𝑋𝑋) and 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 (𝑋𝑋) have different signs.
𝑆𝑆1 (𝑋𝑋) and 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 (𝑋𝑋) can be estimated by assuming a value function from Tversky and

Kahneman (1992) cumulative prospect theory. The value function is given as;
𝑥𝑥 𝛼𝛼
𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼 (𝑥𝑥) = �
−𝑘𝑘(−𝑥𝑥 𝛼𝛼 )

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 < 0

(1) with k≥1 and 0≤α≤1. k reflects

loss aversion while α reflects diminishing sensitivity. Lower values of α indicate that
an individual is risk-averse in the gain domain and risk-seeking in the loss domain. To
calculate 𝑆𝑆1 (𝑋𝑋) and 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 (𝑋𝑋) the parameters of prospect theory (i.e 𝛼𝛼 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘) need to be

estimated.

To estimate prospect theory parameters Abdellaoui et al. (2008) defined the
utility that an individual derives from a prospect by three functions. They are the
probability weighting function for gain (𝑤𝑤 + ), the probability weighting function for

loss (𝑤𝑤 − ) and the utility function (u). Probability weighting is a concept from prospect
theory that states that people weight probabilities for gain and losses differently. To
mathematically express the utility of a prospect, we have to define a gain prospect, loss
prospect and mixed prospect.
The utility of a gain prospect is expressed in prospect theory as
𝑤𝑤 + (𝑝𝑝)(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)) + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)

(2𝑎𝑎)
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A gain prospect is denoted as x,p;y, It means that the prospect offers x with a probability
of p and y with a probability of 1-p where x≥y≥0 while a loss prospect also denoted as
(x,p;y) but implies that x≤y≤0 while a mixed prospect implies that x>0>y.
The utility of a loss prospect is expressed as
𝑤𝑤 − (𝑝𝑝)(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)) + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)

(2𝑏𝑏)

𝑤𝑤 + and 𝑤𝑤 − are the probability functions for gains and losses respectively. We can

interpret equation 2a(2b) as a scenario in which the decision-maker stand a chance of
gaining (losing) at least u(y) and an additional 𝑤𝑤 𝑠𝑠 (𝑝𝑝)(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)) where s = + -. The

utility of a mixed prospect (x,p;y) is defined as

𝑢𝑢 = 𝑤𝑤 + (𝑝𝑝)𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑤𝑤 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦)

(3)

The expression of equation (3) implies that expected utility is a special case of prospect
theory, where the probability weighting functions are expressed as 𝑤𝑤 + (𝑝𝑝) = 𝑤𝑤 − (𝑝𝑝) =

𝑝𝑝. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the probability weighting functions 𝑤𝑤 +

and 𝑤𝑤 − exhibit diminishing sensitivity, this leads to the utility function being concave
for gains and convex for losses (i.e S-shaped utility function).

Having expressed the utility of gain (loss) and mixed prospect, we now discuss
how loss aversion can be measured. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) stated that loss aversion
can be measured by simultaneously measuring utility for gains and losses. According
to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion can be defined as a case in which the
utility for loss (-u(-x)) is greater than the utility for gain (u(x)) for all values of x>0.
From the definition of loss aversion by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion
coefficient can be defined as the mean or median of

−𝑢𝑢(−𝑥𝑥)
𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥)

over relevant x (Abdellaoui

et al. 2008). The loss aversion elicitation method of Abdellaoui et al. (2008) consisted
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of three stages. The first stage elicited utility in the gain domain, the second stage
elicited utility in the loss domain, and the third stage linked utility in the gain and loss
domains together. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), observable utility
comprises of loss aversion coefficient k>0 which reflects that individuals process gains
and losses differently, and a basic utility u that reflects values of outcomes. The value
function is represented as
To elicit utility in the gain domain Abdellaoui et al. (2008) selected a probability pg that
they kept constant throughout the experiment. They chose a series of gain prospects
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 ; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ) and elicited the certainty equivalents of the chosen series. Following

equations 1 and 2a, the utility of the certainty equivalent can be represented as ;

Or

𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 + �𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )� + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )

(4)

𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈 −1 ((𝛿𝛿 + �𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )� + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ))

(5)

Where 𝛿𝛿 + = 𝑤𝑤 + (𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 ). Equation 5 can be estimated through non-linear least squares by

adopting a parametric function. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) adopted a power function U(𝑥𝑥)
= 𝑥𝑥 𝛼𝛼 We can rewrite equation 5 as

1�
𝛼𝛼

𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = (𝛿𝛿 + (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 ) + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 ))

(6)

where α and 𝛿𝛿 + are parameters to be estimated. The parameter α measures the curvature
of the utility function while 𝛿𝛿 + measures the impact of the probability weighting.

To elicit utility on the loss domain Abdellaoui et al. (2008) followed a procedure similar
to the one described in the gain domain. They selected a series of prospects (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 ; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )

for which o≥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖> 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,
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i =1,……..,k, 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 = 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 and elicited their certainty equivalent 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 .
From equations 1, 2a and 2b we can express 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 as ;
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈 −1 ((𝛿𝛿 − �𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )� + 𝑢𝑢(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )

(7)

Equation 7 can be estimated through a non-linear least square method by adopting a
parametric specification for u. To measure the loss aversion parameter (k) Abdellaoui
et al. (2008) established a link between utility for gains and utility for losses by eliciting
a single indifference. A certainty equivalent G* from within 0 − 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 is selected, an
interval from which utility has been estimated in the gain domain.

L* is determined using (𝐺𝐺 ∗ , 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 , 𝐿𝐿∗ ) ⁓ 0. Where ⁓ signify indifference. The utility u(0)
can be represented as;

𝛿𝛿 + 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺 ∗ ) + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘(𝐿𝐿∗ ) = 𝑢𝑢(0) = 0

(8)

The loss aversion parameter (k) can be easily determined from equation 8 since we
know 𝛿𝛿 + , 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺 + ), 𝛿𝛿 − and 𝑢𝑢(𝐿𝐿∗ ) from equations 5 and 7
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Chapter 4
4.0
Methods and Data
To meet the objectives of this study a laboratory experiment was carried out. We used
a laboratory experiment because we believe it is the most appropriate method to collect
data for this study. It allows us to observe the behavior of subjects under different
market conditions. Laboratory experiment also allows us to change parameters of
interest and observe the effect of the change on the subject’s behavior (Levitt and List
2007). We carried out a laboratory experiment using a subject pool made up of
undergraduate and graduate students from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. We use
a student pool because this is an exploratory research and we believe that prior research
on this area does not exist and therefore the use of student population is appropriate.
We conducted a combination of within and between-subjects treatment. The price
treatment was a within-subject design, every subject received the same price treatment
but in different sequence order. We controlled for insurance by having a treatment and
a control group. We also control for order effect (explained in section 4.2) by using five
different sequence orders. we collected data from 20 participants in each sequence
order. Table 1 shows the number of participants that took part in the study. We had a
balanced number of subjects in the group with an insurance option and without an
insurance option.
Table 1 Distribution of Participants by Treatment and Sequence Order
Order1 Order2

Order3

Order4

Order5

Total

Insurance
Treatment
No insurance

20

20

20

20

20

100

20

20

20

20

20

100

Total

40

40

40

40

40

200
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4.1

Experimental Design

To measure myopic loss aversion and its role in grain marketing, we designed a threestage experiment. The purpose of the first stage is to measure individual prospect theory
parameters and elicit MLA. In the second stage of the experiment, we used a
combination of within-subject and between-subject treatments. Within-subject
treatment means all subjects received the same treatment, making it possible to examine
the behavior of the same subjects under different treatments. In our study, we used a
within-subject design to examine the hedging behavior of the subjects under different
market conditions. We used a between-subject design to examine the effect of insurance
on hedging behavior. We randomly divided the subjects into two groups, treatment and
control groups. The treatment group was exposed to the crop insurance treatment
option. In summary, all subjects for this study received the same price treatment,
however, not all subjects received insurance treatment.
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4.2

Description of Experimental Procedure

Stage 1
In stage 1 we elicited MLA. To measure MLA we considered two evaluation modes
(Myopic and non-myopic) of an investment. 𝑆𝑆1 is the myopic view of the investment

and 𝑆𝑆3 is the non-myopic view of the investment. An individual is said to be myopic if

𝑆𝑆 1 < 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 > 0. 𝑆𝑆1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆3 were calculated using individual prospect theory

parameter estimates. 𝑆𝑆1 is the utility obtained from a single shot at Samuelson’s Lottery
L (200,05;-100,0.5) and 𝑆𝑆3 is the utility from three independent shots at lottery L
($600,0.125; $300,0.375; 0, 0.375; -$300, 0.125).

We estimated individual prospect theory parameters following the approach of
Abdellaoui et al. (2008) explained in our theoretical background. To estimate utility in
the gain and loss domain, we had 6 tasks each. A task is generated from each prospect
presented in Table 2 by creating a series of iterations. From the series of iterations, we
obtain a certainty equivalent to that prospect. An illustration of a series of iterations
created from prospect 1 in Table 2 (2000,0.5; 0,0.5) is shown in Table 3. The first

options in the series of iterations are riskless, only the second option is risky. The
second option is kept constant throughout a particular task. We obtain the first option
(indifference value) in Table 3 by simply finding the expected value of the
prospect 2000,0.5; 0,0.5. The certainty equivalent changes as we move from one

iteration to another. The size of the certainty equivalent increases or decreases based on
the choice made by the subject. In this illustration (Table 3) we have bolded choices
made. The size of the change in the certainty equivalent is determined by adding (or
subtracting) half the change from the previous iteration with a condition that the number
must be a multiple of 10. When the numbers are not multiples of 10 they are rounded
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down. This method gives an interval within which the certainty equivalent value
(indifference) should lie, the mid-point of this interval is taken as the certainty
equivalent.
Table 2 Prospects to determine utility for gains and utility for losses

|xi|
|yi|

1

2

3

4

5

6

2000
0

4000
0

6000
0

10000
0

10000
6000

10000
8000

Table 3 An illustration of bisection Method
Iteration

Offered in the elicitation of Gi

1

1000 vs (2000,1/2;0)

2

500 vs (2000,1/2;0)

3

750 vs (2000,1/2;0)

4

620 vs (2000,1/2;0)

5

680 vs (2000,1/2;0)

6

710 vs (2000,1/2;0)
Indifference 695

We also had one task to measure loss aversion. Each iteration was presented to
subjects as a binary choice question in all the tasks. A binary choice approach is used
because it leads to fewer inconsistencies (Abdellaoui et al. 2008) from the subjects. We
used 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 = 1/2 for simplicity. The probability value used does not change the value of

utility estimated (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). The probability was kept constant for all tasks
in Stage 1. An example of a binary choice question used in our study is presented in
figure 1 below.
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Altogether we had 13 tasks in stage 1. The 13 tasks elicited certainty equivalents for
gains, losses and loss aversion parameter.
Figure 1An e.xample of a binary choice question

We used a substantial amount to measure utility in our study. A substantial amount was
used to detect the curvature of the utility (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). According to Wakker
and Daneffe (1999) cited in Abdellaoui et al. (2008), utility is approximately linear for
a small amount of money. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) used multiples of £1000 to facilitate
the tasks for the subjects, we followed the same approach by using multiples of $1000.
Loss aversion coefficient (k) was determined by selecting the certainty equivalent from
prospect 6 (G6) and determining the loss amount L* for which the subject is indifferent
with zero (G6*,1/2; L*) ⁓ 0.
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2.0

STAGE 2

To test the effect of MLA on grain marketing, subjects were required to participate in
a marketing simulation game. For this study, we adopted a simplified version of a
marketing simulation game called Marketing in a New Era (MINE). MINE is a
marketing simulation game that allows participants to improve their marketing
knowledge by exposing them to different market conditions. In MINE, users can play
the pre-harvest or the post-harvest part of the game. In this study, we used the simplified
version of MINE that provides a user with the opportunity to engage in only cash
forward contracts. We did not consider other forms of pre-harvest contracts such as
futures contracts, basis contracts, hedge to arrive, and options. We used the simplified
version to accommodate subjects that may not be familiar with grain marketing without
compromising the objective of the study. We evaluated the role of MLA on grain
marketing decisions without having to worry about the presence of multiple instruments
interacting with the MLA variable to influence the grain marketing decision. In preharvest marketing, the producer has the opportunity of locking prices before harvest.
Pre-harvest marketing can begin years before the intended date of delivery, stated
differently pre-harvest marketing can occur several years before the grain is even
planted. To keep things simple, subjects had the opportunity to hedge once in a year
and it occurred on April 15th of the year in our experiment. We chose April because it
is after planting period and historically futures price of grain for an October delivery is
highest at this time. In each period, subjects had the opportunity of hedging part or all
of their expected production in the spring (April) if they decide to hedge. Any unhedged
grain in the spring was sold using the harvest price in October, which is typically the
harvest period for corn. The cash price we used was made up of futures and basis,
although the subjects only saw the cash price as a single component.
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In this study, we used previously experienced actual cash prices and normalized
the historical prices to current prices without losing the pattern of price movement for
the year. To normalize the price, we used the current price of grain as the starting price.
The price at harvest (October) is determined by considering the percentage change
between the cash price in April 15th for the chosen year and the price on October 15th
for that same year. For example, if the previous cash price of corn on April 15th for an
October delivery was 2.71 and the harvest price was 2.27, then the percentage change
between spring (April) and harvest (October) price is 16%. To normalize the prices in
this illustration, we use the current spring as the starting price and calculate the harvest
price as a 16% increase from the spring price.
Subjects were given an expected yield that was kept constant for
everyone throughout the experiment. They were informed that the expected yield is not
a guarantee that means the actual yield may be higher or lower than the given expected
yield, stated differently; they are exposed to yield risk. We controlled for the effect of
the presence of insurance on hedging decisions by having a group with insurance
purchase options and a group without it. At the beginning of the Stage 2 game, subjects
in the insurance group were given the option of buying a revenue protection insurance
at a 75% coverage level. We opted for a coverage level (75%) because it is the most
commonly purchased coverage level purchased by producers. We kept the coverage
level fixed because we are only interested in the effect of insurance on hedging but not
on the effect of insurance coverage levels on hedging. Subjects were told that the
insurance only covers the futures price component of the cash price, implying exposure
to basis risk
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3.0

Price Treatment

To examine the effect of MLA on pre-harvest grain marketing under different market
conditions, we used a price treatment depicting the different market conditions that we
are interested in. The prices came from Nebraska corn cash price for five different years.
We chose the prices from a combination of normal, steady, and drought years. A normal
year is one in which cash price in the spring for fall delivery is at least 10% greater than
the cash price at harvest. A steady year is one in which the difference between the cash
price in the spring for fall delivery and the cash price at harvest is less than 10%. A
drought year is one in which futures price in the spring for fall delivery is at least 10%
less than the cash price at harvest. We included three normal years, one steady year,
and one drought year. We chose to include more normal years than drought and steady
years because observation of historical futures data shows that there are more normal
years than any other. The five years included in our price treatment came from 1993
(steady year), 1998 (normal year), 2004 (normal year), 2008 (normal year), and 2012
(a drought year). Prices from each year represent a treatment and a unique marketing
condition.
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4.0

Amount of Bushel available for Hedging

All subjects were given an expected production output of 131,400 bushels (bu). We
arrived at this value using an average of 900 acres of farmland and actual production
history (APH) of 146 bu. We used the APH from non-irrigated corn in Nebraska which
is 146 bu per acre (900*146 =131,400). The actual yield we used for the experiment
also came from non-irrigated corn in Nebraska. The actual yield was only made known
to the subjects at the end of a production year. The subjects were told that if they hedged
more than their actual production, the money value of the difference between the
quantity hedged and the actual production would be deducted from their total sales for
the year in the form of buy-back expenses.
5.0

Insurance Premium

Participants in the insurance treatment group were given a choice to buy insurance or
leave their grain unprotected. We used the insurance premium from USDA. An RP
coverage of 75% cost the subjects 14.1ECU (Experimental currency units) per acre. An
indemnity was paid to subjects if their actual revenue calculated using the December
futures price at harvest was less than the guaranteed revenue. The cost of insurance
premium was always deducted from the revenue irrespective of a disastrous occurrence
if the subject purchased insurance. The Guaranteed revenue was calculated using
February 1st futures price for harvest delivery as follow; Guaranteed revenue = February
price*0.75*APH*900
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6.0

Production Costs

Production cost was included in the simulation game. The cost per bushel was set at
2.84 ECU per bu, a value obtained using Nebraska crop budgets for 2019 non-irrigated
corn with soybean rotation (https://cropwatch.unl.edu/budgets). We subtracted the real
estate opportunity cost from the cost of production on the budget, we did this because
the land is part of the endowment that the subject received at the start of the experiment.
The production cost was fixed at 373,176 ECU (131,400*2.84 = 373,176). The cost
of production was deducted at the end of each period (year)
7.0

Timeline

There were 5 periods (marketing year) with two opportunities to sell grain. The first
opportunity to sell occurred at the beginning of the year, which is April 15th in this
study. Any grain left unpriced will be automatically sold by the computer using the
harvest price in October.
8.0

Amount of grain sold per transaction

A standard Futures contract is 5000 bushels per contract, we created cash contracts in
multiples of 5000bu, and subjects could contract up to 25,000 bu at once. There was no
limit to the amount of grain that subject could contract in the spring, however, we
restricted the amount to the expected production
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Figure 2 Hedging Decision Screen

9.0

Instructions provided to subjects

This study was conducted remotely using MINE (https://mine.unl.edu/) online. We
created a PowerPoint presentation of the instructions for the experiment. We used
screenshots from the actual experiment and animations to effectively convey the
context of the experiment to the subjects. Subjects received a copy of the presentation
via email; they were advised to read the instructions before attempting the game.
Subjects could ask any question through the email provided to them on the instruction
or through the experimenter’s phone number. A copy of the instruction slides is
presented in the appendix. We present a summary of the prior information given to the
subjects in Table 4.
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Table 4 Information Provided to Subjects

Information provided

Amount

Type of information (fixed
or variable)

Expected Production

131,400 bu

fixed

Production cost

373,176 ECU

fixed

Insurance premium

14.1

fixed

Number of periods

5

fixed

Guaranteed revenue

Based on futures price variable
in February

*Insurance premium was added to production cost when subject
purchases insurance
10.

Information Feedback provided

Subjects received feedback on the quantity of their expected production that they have
hedged to keep them informed and aware of their decisions. The information on
quantity hedged is provided to subjects in the form of a chart showing the percentage
of the expected production hedged. The percentage increases as the subject hedge more
grain within the year. An example of this chart is shown in figure 3. At the end of the
year, subjects were provided with feedback on earnings, production cost, insurance
payment, and buyback expenses. The feedback was provided to participants in the form
of a summary screen, an example of the summary screen is provided in figure 4.
Subjects received feedback on the quantity of grain sold, the price, and time
(April or October) at which the grain was sold. The cost of production and insurance
premium is summed up as fixed expenses in the summary screen. The total sale is
calculated using spring price (when hedging occurred), harvest price, and insurance
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payments (if any). The cost of production and buyback expenses (if any) is deducted
from the total sales.
Finally, subjects were provided with information on their actual production for
the year. The amount of grain presold at the start of the year is also provided on this
screen so that the subjects can compare the amount of grain they hedged against the
amount they produced. At the end of a period, before the subjects moved to the next
year, they were provided with information on yearly earnings as well as their progress
within the game. An illustration of this feedback is presented in figures 4 to 6.
Figure 3 Feedback on the quantity of grain hedged
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Figure 4 feedback at the end of the year

Figure 5 Feedback on actual production
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Figure 6 Feedback on yearly profit and game progress

11.0

Practice Periods

To test the understanding of the subjects about the tasks before proceeding into the main
game we provided a practice period for both stage 1 and stage 2. The practice for stage
2 started after stage 1 game ended. The practice questions for stage 1 was different from
the questions that the subjects were asked in the main game. In stage two practice
sessions, we used a price series that was different from the once used in the main game.
We made every other information from the main game similar to what we had on the
practice session.
12.0

Experimental Demand Effect

Experimental demand effect (EDE) is a term used to describe the behavior of subjects
in an experiment resulting from their perceptions of what constitutes a desired behavior
in the experiment. EDE tends to have a stronger impact in a within-subject design
treatment and it can potentially confound an experiment (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn
2012). A possible source of EDE that can be of concern in a within-subject treatment
design is the order effect.
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The order effect refers to the behavior from experimental subjects resulting from the
order with which the treatments are presented to the subjects. Order effect is an
important concern in a within-subject treatment design where subjects participate in
more than one treatment. A within-subject treatment is appropriate for this study
because it gives the experimenter the chance to observe the behavior of the same subject
under different market conditions. The within-subject design provides an internal
validity that does not rely on random assignment (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn 2012).
We address the concern for order effects through a counterbalancing technique known
as Latin square. This method of counterbalancing presents treatments to subjects in a
manner that each treatment occurs once in each row and each column (Houston 1966).
Since we have five treatments in this study, we used a 5×5 Latin square arrangement
presented in Table 5. With this arrangement, each group of participants received
different orders of presentation. Using the 5×5 Latin square arrangement we had 5
groups each for insurance and without insurance treatment. Subjects were randomly
assigned to groups.

Table 5 Order of treatment presentation
T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

T2

T3

T4

T5

T1

T3

T4

T5

T1

T2

T4

T5

T1

T2

T3

T5

T1

T2

T3

T4

Note: T represent treatment.
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13

Payment

Subjects were incentivized for this study using amazon gift cards. Gift cards have been
used in economic studies as a means of incentivizing experimental subjects (Hafalir
and Loewenstein 2009; Coopersmith, Bruursema, and Feeney 2016). Abdellaoui et al.
(2010) stated that a significant amount of incentive is important in the measurement of
utility. In their study, the maximum amount of gain at stake was €10,000. They paid all
subjects participation fee of €10 and randomly picked a participant to play out a gain
question in which the actual payment was divided by 10. In our study we paid
participants a $10 participation fee, Unlike Abdellaoui et al. (2010) all subjects were
given a chance to play out a gain question in stage 1, the maximum amount at stake in
stage 1 was 10,000 ECU. We used experimental currency (ECU) to increase incentives
and reduce experimental costs. To determine payment in stage 1, the computer
randomly selected a gain question, and payment of the subject depended on the decision
that they made for that question. For example in figure 1 in section 4.2, if a subject
chose the riskless option for that question their payment for stage 1 will be 1000 ECU,
however, if they chose the risky option the computer will randomly select an outcome
between 2000 ECU and 0 ECU.
Payment from stage 2 came from the earnings that subjects made from the 5 periods.
In addition to earnings made from stage 2, we paid a bonus to subjects who earned a
profit above zero. We paid a bonus to reward good marketing decisions and to keep
subjects engaged throughout the different market conditions they were exposed to. The
bonus was 25% of earnings from stage 2, only if the earning is above zero. The total
amount made by the subjects in the experiment was made known to them at the end of
the experiment. We used an exchange rate of $1 to 50,000 ECU to convert earnings
made in the experiment to U.S dollars. The average earning from the study was $14.
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4.0

Stage 3

At the end of stage 2, subjects participated in a brief survey. The purpose of the survey
was to collect data on demographic characteristics of the subjects such as age, school
level, gender, etc. We also collected data on subjects' familiarity with probability and
expected value. This is was to test if there is a significant difference between subjects
who are familiar with the concept as against subjects who are not familiar with the
concept. Data was also collected on familiarity with grain marketing and farming.
4.3
Econometric Model.
Our dependent variables are the quantity of grain hedged per year and the profit
obtained per year. To measure MLA we used prospect theory parameters obtained from
stage 1 to calculate 𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆3 . Using Langer and Webber Theoretical framework we
categorized subjects into three groups based on the sign of 𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑆𝑆3

Group 1: subjects with 𝑆𝑆1 > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 > 0 this is the group that will invest in both

evaluation mode. (No Myopia and No loss aversion)

Group 2: subjects with 𝑆𝑆1 < 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 > 0 this is the group that will invest only in nonmyopic evaluation mode (MLA)

Group 3: subjects with 𝑆𝑆1 < 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆3 < 0 this is the group that will not invest in both
evaluation mode (HLA).

To examine the effect of MLA on hedging we used categorical variables for MLA
groups. We used group 1 (No MLA) as the baseline for comparing the impact of risk
preferences on hedging (Profit). We controlled for insurance and order effect. We used
a dummy variable to control for the effect of insurance on hedging; no insurance option
was coded 0 while insurance was coded 1. The order effect is the sequence with which
the treatments were presented to the subjects. We have five price treatment, which
implies 5 order. We used five dummy variables to represent the order in our regression
model. We control for subjects’ learning experience within the experiment by using a
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continuous variable to represent experience. The value for experience variable ranges
from 1 to 5. We interacted experience with MLA and HLA because estimates from the
interaction will show the impact of MLA (HLA) that occurred simultaneously with
experience within the experiment.
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5

5

𝑝𝑝=1

𝑞𝑞=1

+ 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
(9)

Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable for the ith individual in year t; mla is a dummy

variable equal to 1 when the producer exhibits myopic loss aversion; hla is a dummy
variable representing high loss aversion equal to 1 when hla is present. Exp is the
learning experience within the experiment, with values ranging from 1 to 5. mlaExp is
the interaction term between mla and Exp; hlaExp is the interaction term between hla
and Exp. I represent the insurance dummy variable and T is the price treatment
represented by dummy variables, p ranges from 1 to 5; and the treatment order controls,
represented by dummy variables with values ranging from 1 to 5. The constant (𝛽𝛽0 )

represents someone with no mla, and in the no insurance option group. The constant

also contains the baseline for price treatment and one of the five order effects. We
estimate two regressions. In the first regression the dependent variable (Yi ) is quantity
of grain hedged by subject i, in the second regression Yi is the profit made by subject i.
The independent variables remained the same in both regressions.
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Chapter 5
5.0
Results and Implications
In the following sections, we will present our results on subjects’ prospect theory
parameter estimates, MLA risk preferences analysis, descriptive statistics on subjects’
grain marketing decisions, results on the survey of socio-demographic characteristics,
and regression results.
5.1 Analysis of Individual Prospect Theory Parameter Estimates
As mentioned before, we followed the approach of Abdellaoui et al (2008) in estimating
prospect theory parameters. We estimated a power function specification for utility. We
used the estimates from the power function to classify subjects based on the shape of
their utility for gains and losses. Following Abdellaoui et al (2008) we classify a
subject’s utility for gain as concave (convex) if the power estimate for gain was less
(greater) than 1. For losses, an individual is said to have a convex (concave) utility if
the power estimate for losses is less (greater) than 1. Subjects were also classified into
three categories based on the choices they made on each prospect presented to them.
We presented subjects with gains, losses, and mixed prospects. In this study, we used
6 prospects each for gains and losses, while we used only one question for the mixed
prospect to elicit loss aversion.
We classify a subject as risk-averse if their certainty equivalent for a prospect
was less than the expected value, risk-neutral if the expected value is equal to the
certainty equivalent, and risk-seeking if the certainty equivalent is greater than the
expected value. Since we have six prospects each for gains and losses, we classified a
subject as risk-averse for gains (losses) if at least 4 out of the 6 prospects produced
certainty equivalents less than the expected values. A subject is risk-seeking if 4 out of
the 6 prospects produced certainty equivalence greater than the expected values and
risk-neutral if they produced certainty equivalence values equal to the expected values.
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We elicited loss aversion parameter by finding the loss amount that establishes an
indifference between the certainty equivalent of prospect 6 and zero. We classified a
subject as loss averse if the elicited loss aversion parameter is greater than 1 and gain
seeking if the loss aversion parameter is less than 1.
5.2

Risk Attitude Based on Certainty Equivalence

Table 6 shows the certainty equivalents from the prospects used in eliciting utility in
the gain and loss domain. The median certainty equivalent for both gains and losses
was fairly similar both reflecting risk-averse behavior. The mean certainty equivalent
from two loss questions shows a seeking-attitude toward losses. Overall, the results of
Table 6 show a dominant risk-averse behavior for both gains and losses, however, the
results of Table 7 show a less proportion of risk-aversion in the loss domain relative to
the gain domain. The Median certainty equivalents for both gains and losses were fairly
similar to the findings of Abdellaoui et al (2008). Table 8 shows the result of the
certainty equivalent for the mixed prospect, the results show a strong risk-aversion for
the mixed prospect. The amount of loss that subjects were willing to accept was less
than the corresponding gain. 89% of the subjects were risk-averse for the mixed
prospect, this proportion was slightly higher than the 80% that Abdellaoui et al (2008)
reported in their study.
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Table 6 Elicited Certainty Equivalents Gains and Losses (Absolute value)
Prospect

Gains

Losses

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

1

915 (695-1030)

906

945(825-1165)

1027

2

1840 (1375-2085)

1763

1900 (1585-2200)

1979

3

2845 (2380-3130)

2838

2845 (2468-3345)

3012

4

4755 (4135-5220)

4665

4755 (4220-5220)

4779

5

7625 (7625-8375)

7872

7625 (7625-8375)

7846

6

8960 (8570-9405)

8997

8570 (8570-9405)

8820

Interquartile ranges are in parenthesis
Table 7 Classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude
losses
Gains

Risk averse
68
30
10
108

Risk averse
Risk seeking
mixed
total

Risk seeking
45
13
10
68

mixed
12
6
6
24

Table 8 Elicited Certainty Equivalents for Mixed Question
G*

L*

Median

8960 (8570-9405)

5782 (3935-8510)

Mean

8997

5789

Interquartile range in parenthesis

total
125
49
26
200
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5.3 Elicited Utility for gain and Losses
Table 9 shows the estimated prospect theory utility parameters. Our results show a
linear utility for gains and concave utility for losses. We obtained a median power
estimate of 1.01 for gains and 1.18 for losses. The mean power estimate for gains was
not significantly different from 1 (p = 0.185), the mean power estimate for losses was
however significantly different from1 (p<0.000). This finding does not strictly conform
to the supposition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) S-shape utility that implies
concavity for gains and convexity for losses. The deviation from Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) conjecture of S-shape utility could be from the fact that we conducted
this study during a pandemic when there was a lockdown. Abdellaoui et al (2008) also
obtained a result that deviated from the S-shape utility reported in Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). They reported concavity in the utility for both gains and losses
Table 9 Power Estimates and Loss aversion
Power estimate gains

Power estimate loss

Median
IQR

1.01
0.74-1.30

1.18
0.90- 1.53

Mean

1.03

1.22

Loss
aversion
1.07
0.08 3.11
2.46

We classified subjects based on the shape of their utility function for gains and losses
in Table 10. The results show that 46% of the subjects have a convex utility for gain
and concave utility for losses. 29% of the subjects have power estimates that follow the
S-shape utility conjecture proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Overall, we
observed a 50% concavity for gains and 33% convexity for losses. The dominant utility
shape for losses was concavity 67%, this proportion is slightly higher than the 59%
concavity for utility in the loss domain that Abdellaoui et al (2008) reported. Comparing
the results of Table 9 with the results from Table 6, it is obvious that the risk aversion
we observed in the gain domain did not translate to concavity. This is because there is
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“no one-to-one” relationship between risk aversion and concavity. (Abdellaoui et al
(2008)
The estimate for loss aversion is presented in Table 9. We obtained a mean loss
aversion parameter of 2.46 which is an indication of the presence of loss aversion
among the subjects. The value of loss aversion we obtained is fairly similar to the
median loss aversion reported by Abdellaoui et al (2008). The results of Table 8 shows
that on the individual level 51% of the subjects were loss averse.
Table 10 Classification of subjects based on the shape of their utilities

Gain

concave
convex
total

losses
concave
41
93
134

convex
59
7
66

Total
100
100
200

Table 11 Classification of Subjects Based on Loss Aversion Parameter
Loss aversion
Category

Criteria used

Loss aversion

Subject is loss averse if
the loss aversion
parameter is greater than
1
Subject is said to have no
loss aversion if the loss
aversion parameter is less
than 1

No loss aversion

5.3

Number of
participants per
category
102

percentage

98

49

51

Probability Weighting Estimates

The result of the probability weighting estimates is presented in Table 12, the results
show evidence of probability underweighting for both gains and losses. The findings of
Table 9 compares fairly with the findings of Abdellaoui et al (2008).
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Table 12 Probability weighting Estimates
median
0.47
0.42

W+
W-

mean
0.47
0.44

IQR
0.36-0.57
0.34-0.52

5.4 Analysis of Myopic Loss Aversion Parameter among Subjects
Following the approach of Langer and Webber (2005), we classified subjects based on
the sign on their utility for S1 and S3. As mentioned before, S1 is the utility from a single
shot at a lottery that offers a 50% chance of a $200 win and a 50% chance of a $100
loss. S3 is the utility from the aggregation of three independent shots at the same lottery.
Using the individual estimates from prospect theory parameters we obtained from stage
1 we estimated S1 and S3. An individual is said to have MLA if S1<0 and S3 >0, No
MLA S1>0 and S3 >0 and high loss aversion (HLA) if S1<0 and S3 < 0. Table 13 shows
the distribution of subjects according to their MLA status. The results show that 37%
of the subjects had MLA while 59% had no MLA.
Table 13 Distribution of Subjects according to their MLA status
MLA category

Criteria used for MLA

MLA

Subjects who would not
invest in S1 but will
invest in S3
Subjects who would
invest in both S1 and S3
Subjects who would not
invest in S1 and S3

No mla
High loss aversion

Number of participants
per category
74

Percentage of the sample

118

59

8

4
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5.5
Descriptive Analysis of Subjects’ Grain marketing Decisions
In this study, subjects were allowed to market grain in five different years. For each
year, subjects had only two opportunities to sell their grain, the first opportunity was at
the start of the year (pre-harvest) while the second was at the end of the year (postharvest) which was done by the computer. We were interested in observing the quantity
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of grain that subjects sold at pre-harvest each year and the profit they obtained at the
end of the marketing year. We were also interested in observing how insurance affects
hedging behavior, so we controlled for insurance by having an insurance treatment
group and a control group.
1

Graphical Relationship between Dependent Variables and
Treatment Variables

We present charts showing the average quantity of grain hedged and profits obtained
by subjects. Figure 7 shows the average quantity of grain hedged by subjects for the
five price treatments used in this study. Figure 8 shows the average profit obtained from
the five years. Figures 9 and 10 show the average quantity hedged by insurance
treatment and control groups. The result shows more hedging among subjects with
insurance options than subjects in the control group. Figures 11 and 12 show a
comparison between the profit from the insurance treatment group and profit from the
control group. The result indicates a higher profit among subjects in the insurance
treatment group relative to the control group. The results suggest that combining
hedging and the option to purchase insurance is more profitable than hedging alone.
As mentioned before, we control for order effect by having 5 different sequence
order. We controlled for order effect because we believe that the sequence order of
presenting price treatment to subjects might affect their behavior. Figure 13 shows the
average hedging by treatment order. The result shows a minimal variation in the
average hedging between the different sequence orders. We did not observe any
variation in the average profit made between the sequence orders. Figure 14 shows the
average profit made by sequence orders.
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Figure 7 Average Hedging by Year
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Figure 9 Average Hedging by Year between Insurance and No Insurance Treatment
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

2012

2008

2004
No_insu

1998

1993

Insurance

Figure 10 Average Hedging Between No Insurance and Insurance Treatment
72500
72000
71500
71000
70500
70000
69500
69000
68500
68000
67500
67000

No_Insurance

Insurance

46

Figure 11 Comparison between Profits from Insurance and No Insurance Option
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Figure 13 Average Hedging by Treatment Sequence Order
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Figure 14 Average Profit by Sequence Order
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Next, we present the relationship between our dependent variables and learning
experience within the experiment. Figure 15 shows the average quantity of grain hedged
by subjects as they progress within the experiment. The result suggests that as subjects
progress within the experiment they were willing to take more hedging risk. Figure 16
shows the average profit obtained as subjects progressed within the experiment
Figure 15 Relationship between Average Hedging and Experience
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2

Relationship between Risk Preferences and Dependent Variables

We present average hedging by risk preferences in figure 17. The result shows slightly
higher hedging among subjects with no MLA relative to subjects with MLA. The group
with HLA hedged more grain than the group with MLA and no MLA. This result is not
surprising because HLA is pure loss aversion without myopia. They are not myopic in
their decision making but places more weight in the occurrence of fall prices going
below the spring prices they see at the beginning of the year. To avoid a possible drop
in price, HLA individuals hedge more of their expected yield in the spring. In figure
18, we present the connection between risk attitude and profit. The result shows a higher
profit for the group with HLA relative to the two other categories of risk attitude. Figure
19 shows the average profit of the three categories of risk in a bar chart.
In figure 20 we connect hedging and experience by risk attitude. The result shows more
hedging among HLA group as they progressed within the experiment. Figure 21 shows
profit by risk attitude as subjects progressed in the experiment. Figure 21 reflects the
findings in figure 20, as we observed more profit among HLA group as they gained
experience within the experiment.
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Figure 17 Relationship between Average Hedging by Year and Risk Attitude
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Figure 19 Average Profit by Risk Attitude
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Figure 20 Relationship between Average Hedging and Experience
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Figure 21 Relationship between Average Profit and Experience by Risk Attitude
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Analysis of Survey Results

We present the results from the survey in Table 14-16. Table 14 shows the results on
the subject’s perception of their willingness to take risks and knowledge of expected
value. Table 15 presents the summary of the socio-demographic characteristics of the
subjects while Table 16 shows the results on subjects’ farming experience and
familiarity with grain marketing.

Table 14 Results on Subjective Measure of Risk Attitude and Familiarity with
Expected Value
Question
Willingness to take risk

frequency
138

Percentage of sample
69

Perceived knowledge of expected
value

96

48

Subjects who correctly answered
expected value question

112

56

Subjects who refused to take a bet
that offers gain of 200 and loss of
100 with equal chances of
occurrence (loss aversion question)

94

47

53

Table 15 Results on Socio demographic characteristics
Characteristics

Subjects

Male
Age
Mean
Max
Min
Nationality other than American
Undergraduate
Subjects that understood the instructions
Subjects with no prior experience with
economic experiment

102

Percentage of the
sample
51

24
45
18
124
126
160
127

62
63
80
63.5

Table 16 Results on Experience with Farming and Familiarity with grain marketing
Question
Experience from being a farmer

Subjects
34

Percentage of the sample
17

Experience from a family member being a farmer

76

38

Not Familiar with grain marketing

62

31

Slightly familiar with grain marketing

74

37

Somewhat familiar with grain marketing

39

19.5

Moderately familiar with grain marketing

22

11

Extremely familiar with grain marketing

3

1.5

Familiarity with commodity marketing

64

32

5.7

Regression Results

The main focus of this study is to examine the effect of MLA on the quantity of grain
hedged and profit obtained. Our regression model is presented in equation 9. We
estimated two regressions with the first having quantity hedged as the dependent
variable and the second having profit as the dependent variable. we estimated a random
effect model. Insurance was represented using a dummy variable. No insurance (control
group) was used as a baseline for comparison. We used a categorical variable to
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examine the effect of MLA on the dependent variable. The group with no MLA was
the baseline for comparing the effect of MLA and HLA on the dependent variable. We
interacted MLA and HLA with the experience variable. Experience is the learning
experience that subject got from progressing within the experiment. We used a
continuous variable to represent experience. The value for experience ranges from 1 to
5.
We present the regression results in Table 17. As the results of the descriptive
analysis indicated, we did not find any statistically significant difference between the
hedging from subjects with MLA and subjects with no MLA. We estimated marginal
effects of mla and hla, since we interacted both variables with experience. Our results
indicate a statistically significant impact of HLA on hedging. The results show that
subjects with HLA hedged more of their expected yield than subjects with no MLA.
The year dummies included in the regression model were all significant. The year
dummy variable captures everything that happened within a year that is common among
all individuals. An important factor that was common among all subjects in this study
was the price of grain for the year. The statistical significance of the year dummy
variables is an indication that the hedging from the included years was significantly
different from the base year (2008).
We also present the regression for profit in Table 17. The results show a
negative significant impact of experience on profit. As we observed in the descriptive
analysis in section 5.3, the subjects’ willingness to engage in more hedging increased
as they progressed within the experiment. Due to unpredictable changes in grain price
every year, the increase in hedging that we observed among subjects as they progressed
within the experiment did not necessarily transform to higher profit. Results further
indicate a positive significant relationship between crop insurance and profit. This
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finding is not surprising as insurance reduces yield and price risk by paying indemnity
whenever actual yield goes below the actual production history.
As we observed in the first regression, the year dummy variables were all
significant in the regression for profit. The finding indicates a significant difference in
profit between the included year dummy variables and profit from the base year.
Although HLA variable was significant at 10% level, we did not find a marginal
statistical significant impact of HLA on profit.
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Table 17

MLA
HLA
EXP
MLA_EXP
HLA_EXP
Insurance
Order1
Order2
Order3
Order4
Year 2012
Year 1998
Year 2004
Year 1993
constant
Marginal
effect
(MLA)
Marginal
Effect
(HLA)
Marginal
Effect (Exp)

Regression Results

Quantity Hedged
5567
(7777)
27704
(17925)
1101
(1101)

Dependent variable
Profit
-8,887
(9,702)
41,457*
(24,765)
-4,649**
(2,120)

-1737
(1230)
-754
(5313)
-2486
(5933)
-3681
(9108)
9241
(8884)
2170
(8887)
4233
(9481)
11072***
(3233)
12806***
(3051)
6986***
(2850)
16735***
(2877)
57408***
(7810)
356
(6509)

3,495
(2,899)
-10,556
(7,252)
11,369***
(2,803)
2,919
(4,735)
-1,890
(4,400)
-1,258
(4,538)
-3,344
(4,309)
-127,342***
(8,931)
63,330***
(3,989)
41,094***
(4014)
32,718***
(4,818)
30,249***
(8, 143)
1599
(3,045)

25441***
(7839)

9790
(9,370)

428
(730)

-3,779
(1,710)

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Observations 1000

57

6.0
Conclusion
The focus of this study was to examine whether myopic loss aversion can explain the
producer’s pre-harvest grain marketing behavior. To achieve this objective, we
conducted a laboratory experiment that was made up of three stages. In the first stage,
we estimated prospect theory parameters to measure MLA. In the second stage, we
observed the subject’s pre-harvest grain marketing behavior in a simulated market
environment. In the third stage of the experiment, we collected data on the subject’s
demographic characteristics, willingness to take risks, and familiarity with commodity
marketing.
Estimates from our prospect theory parameters suggest a linear utility for gains
and concave utility for losses. We obtained a loss aversion parameter estimates that
indicate the presence of loss aversion. We also found evidence of probability weighting
in both gain and loss domain. Using our estimates of prospect theory parameters, we
estimated MLA and found a 37% presence of MLA among our sampled subjects.
Our regression results indicate that HLA significantly impacts hedging
decisions. We found no statistically significant evidence that MLA impacts hedging.
There was no statistically significant difference between the profit made by subjects
with HLA and subjects with no MLA. We found that experience within the experiment
negatively impact profit. The results show that insurance positively impacts profit.
From our results, we can conclude that although HLA significantly impacts grain
marketing decisions, in the long run, it does not significantly impact profit, While
purchasing insurance significantly impact profit positively.
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Appendix 1: Summary Statistics of Grain Marketing Decision By Treatment and
Sequence Order
Table15 No Insurance Group Order 1
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean
SD
Max

2012

2008

2004

1998

1993

68000
54517
51.7

62750
47751
47.7

71500
53830
54.4

80250
42286
61.0

87000
39749

Treatment
Average
369500
203992

3820
54517
71820

74950
47751
137700

86000
53830
157500

64650
42286
144900

34500
39749
121500

263920
203992
608420

121874
89770
-11906

13695

71715

86454

55796

105786

58500
118674

64596
141915

29177
120781

8057
72751

124773
359627

Treatment
Average

Table 16 No Insurance Group order 2.
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold
at spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean

2008

2004

1998

1993

2012

66000
47700
50.2

72250
46040
54.9

88000
44615
66.9

91000
45352
69.2

78000
52626
59.3

71700
47700
137700

85250
46040
157500

56900
44615
144900

30500
45352
121500

-6180
52626
71820

17816

72615

91801

55051

SD
Max

58671
96536

55248
141915

30785
120781

8999
72751

138188
86217
-11906

99095
86883
336726
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Table 17 No Insurance Group Order 3.
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean

2004

1998

1993

2012

2008

Treatment
Average

76500
52893
58.2

89000
45120
67.7

89500
47542
68.0

83000
53074
63.1

59500
48637
45.2

81000
52893
157500

55900
45120
144900

32000
47542
121500

53074
53074
71820

78200
48637
137700

77715

92491

55032

9821

88370

SD
Max

63471
141915

31133
120781

9685
72751

146688
87354
-11906

59823
96536

90135
381377

Table 18 No Insurance Group order 4
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold
at spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean
SD
Max

1998

1993

2012

2008

2004

69750
48625
53

76000
51212
58

82000
44408
62

63750
49281
49

64250
50191
49

75150
48625
144900

45500
51212
121900

-10180
44408
71820

73950
49281
137700

93250
50191
157500

79209
3351
120781

57936
10158
72751

-144006
73614
-11906

15048
60616
96536

63015
60229
141915

Treatment
Average

71202
79604
180542
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Table 19 No Insurance Group order 5.
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean
SD
Max

1993

2012

2008

2004

1998

59250
48890
45.0

64250
43958
48.8

52000
54178
39.5

61000
47479
46.4

80000
42321
60.8

63100
48890
121500

80650
43958
144900

108929
54178
157500

76700
47479
137700

15069
42321
71820

61239
9689
72751

-114343
71670
11906

0.62
65293
144424

59115
56974
141915

86230
30137
133560

Treatment
Average

92240
117855
327509

Table 20 Insurance Group order 1
Bushels
Presold
Mean

2012

2008

48750

57000

SD

45592

46152

Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean

37

2004

1998

1993

60500

67000

49404

49388

50351

43.3

43.9

46.0

50.9

23070

80700

99750

84400

54500

SD

45592

46152

49404

49388

50351

Max
Profit
Mean

71820

137700

157500

144900

121500

-32776.635

26682

50773

69019

56389

170087

SD

105177.7787

56391

58922

33692

12485

108498

Max

105295.74

132783

141915

120781

72751

385159

57750

Treatment
Average
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Table 21 Insurance Group order 2.
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean
SD
Max

2008

2004

1998

1993

2012

52250
49510
39

81000
52806
61

81250
48228
61.8

91500
48289
69.6

90000
50419
68.4

86450
49510
137700

76500
52806
157500

63650
48228
144900

30000
48289
121500

18180
50419
71820

17092
63056
132783

79308
65582
165915

83971
33149
120781

50275
12594
72751

-99568
79222
27796

Treatment
Average

131077
99640
351133

Table 22 Insurance Group order 3.
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean
SD
Max

2004

1998

1993

2012

2008

54000
44347
41.0

72250
40833
54.9

69000
43375
52.5

70000
44651
53.2

69250
46012
52.7

103500
44347
157500

72650
40833
134900

52500
43375
121500

1820
44651
71820

68450
46012
137700

44370
52720
141915

76492
26117
120781

54360
11168
72751

-59713
64812
58796

36312
60061
132783

Treatment
Average

151821
116070
229372
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Table 23 Insurance Group 5.
Bushels
Presold
Mean
SD
Percentage of
expected yield
hedged
Bushels sold at
spot market
Mean
SD
Max
Profit
Mean
SD
Max

1993

2012

2008

2004

1998

82750
42472
62.9

79000
45986
60.1

78250
44375
59.5

71000
46442
54.0

73500
42024
55.9

38750
42472
116500

-7180
45986
71820

59450
44375
132700

86500
46442
152500

71400
42024
144900

52162
11449
71801

-86415
91174
89796

45570
54335
132783

67133
57277
192414

77989
30312
120781

Treatment
Average

156439
89960
297744
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